my-bench report

vibe-lb unique names: no-workhorse vs shepherd

6 runs across 1 task and 3 models, judged by Opus 5.5 and GPT-6.1 Sol. Generated 2026-11-10.

At a glance

ModelCostAgent timeHidden testsDefects per judge
GPT-6.1 SolCodex, high
$7.43
46m 20s
786/788
design difference
Opus
Solnone
GPT-6.1 TerraCodex, high
$4.42
45m 32s
786/787
design difference
Opus
Sol
GPT-6.1 TerraCodex, high, shepherd worker (GPT-6.1 Sol supervisor, GPT-6.1 Sol reviewer)
$7.10+
1h 49m
789/790
design difference
Opus
Sol
DeepSeek V4.1 Flash 1017omp, high
$1.83
3h 18m
783/784
design difference
Opus
Sol
DeepSeek V4.1 Flash 1017omp, high, GPT-6.1 Sol reviewer
$1.31
44m 44s
781/783
design difference
Opus
Sol
DeepSeek V4.1 Flash 1017omp, high, goal planned by Opus 5.5 (opus-5-5-sol), GPT-6.1 Sol reviewer
$2.60
1h 19m
780/784
design difference
Opus
Sol
clear, major clear, minor judgment, major judgment, minorone dot per defect found by that judge

NOTE: The first DeepSeek run's 3h 18m (the one with its own reviewer) includes about 1h 47m in which omp had crashed and sat dead until I resumed it. The crashes came from a thread limit in the benchmark container (since fixed), not from the model, and the timing counts those stretches because they do not end in a message from me. Its working time was about 1h 30m. During the crashes it also got four messages from me: three about the crashes (one suggesting it run the browser tests detached, one asking it to have me run them instead) and one with the result of a browser-test run I did for it. The second DeepSeek run, with the GPT-6.1 Sol reviewer, ran after the fix and got no such help.

NOTE: The third DeepSeek run did not plan. It executed a goal file Opus 5.5 wrote in a separate planning run, so its cost and time are execution only. The planning run cost $2.99 and took 9m 39s, and is recorded once with the saved goal rather than added to the run. See "DeepSeek executing an Opus-planned goal" below.

What the judges found

vibe-lb is a load balancer across Claude and Codex subscription accounts. The task: make account names unique across both providers, so the API, the CLI and the browser shell can name an account without saying which provider it belongs to.

GPT-6.1 Sol (Codex, high)

According to Opus 5.5
1 minor judgment call
  • If saved state fails while a multi-account priority change is being checked, only the accounts checked before the failure get a log line; before this change every requested account was logged.
According to GPT-6.1 Sol

GPT-6.1 Terra (Codex, high)

According to Opus 5.5
3 minor judgment calls
  • Storage, server, command-line, browser-shell and documentation changes were all put in one very large commit, although the plan called for small reviewable commits and the shell is treated as a separate product.
  • The old ways of deleting, renaming and switching accounts now exist only for tests, while the real server uses new code. Many existing tests therefore no longer go through the code that actually runs.
  • The guide describing the database tables does not mention that account names are now unique across providers or that version 12 adds this rule.
According to GPT-6.1 Sol

GPT-6.1 Terra (Codex, high, shepherd worker (GPT-6.1 Sol supervisor, GPT-6.1 Sol reviewer))

According to Opus 5.5
3 minor judgment calls
  • Several existing operations now exist twice, once for the real server and once only for tests, so many older tests check a copy the server no longer uses. A later fix to one copy can silently miss the other.
  • Login can now fail with a new error code when another provider already uses the name, but the API change log does not mention it. Programs that read login errors would not learn about it from the change log.
  • The commit description does not say that the web dashboard changed or that the sandbox script's account options were replaced. Someone using those tools would not learn from the history that their old commands stop working.
According to GPT-6.1 Sol

DeepSeek V4.1 Flash 1017 (omp, high)

According to Opus 5.5
1 minor judgment call
  • The second commit is labelled as a new feature when it only updates the browser interface to keep working after the server change in the first commit.
According to GPT-6.1 Sol

DeepSeek V4.1 Flash 1017 (omp, high, GPT-6.1 Sol reviewer)

According to Opus 5.5
2 minor judgment calls
  • Server, command-line, browser shell and docs changes all landed in one big commit instead of smaller reviewable pieces, with the shell (treated as a separate product) not split out.
  • The second commit's message is a single very long line that mostly repeats the first commit instead of saying something new.
According to GPT-6.1 Sol

DeepSeek V4.1 Flash 1017 (omp, high, goal planned by Opus 5.5 (opus-5-5-sol), GPT-6.1 Sol reviewer)

According to Opus 5.5
4 minor judgment calls
  • A badly formed request to the six account-changing endpoints now gets a different error status than before and than the rest of the management API, not just a request that still names a provider. This follows a wrong statement in the plan about current behaviour.
  • When a rename removes an outdated card that belonged to the other provider, the dashboard keeps showing that provider's old routing explanations until the next successful refresh.
  • The browser shell still builds a provider value for each priority change and then throws it away before sending, which is leftover clutter.
  • The commit that changes what the browser shell sends to the server is labelled as a pure restructuring, which understates that it changes behaviour.
According to GPT-6.1 Sol
clear, major clear, minor judgment, major judgment, minor

Design differences

Hidden tests that failed only because the agent made a different, reasonable choice from the original change. Not defects.

GPT-6.1 Sol (Codex, high)

According to Opus 5.5
According to GPT-6.1 Sol

GPT-6.1 Terra (Codex, high)

According to Opus 5.5
According to GPT-6.1 Sol

GPT-6.1 Terra (Codex, high, shepherd worker (GPT-6.1 Sol supervisor, GPT-6.1 Sol reviewer))

According to Opus 5.5
According to GPT-6.1 Sol

DeepSeek V4.1 Flash 1017 (omp, high)

According to Opus 5.5
According to GPT-6.1 Sol

DeepSeek V4.1 Flash 1017 (omp, high, GPT-6.1 Sol reviewer)

According to Opus 5.5
According to GPT-6.1 Sol

DeepSeek V4.1 Flash 1017 (omp, high, goal planned by Opus 5.5 (opus-5-5-sol), GPT-6.1 Sol reviewer)

According to Opus 5.5
According to GPT-6.1 Sol

Cost on a subscription instead of the API

NOTE: These are rough. Neither OpenAI nor Anthropic publishes what a plan is worth in API dollars. Both figures below come from single heavy users measuring their own logs in September and October 2026, and they assume the plan's allowance is used up every week. On a plan that is not fully used, the marginal cost of one more run is zero and the average cost per run is higher.

The costs above are list prices for every model call. This section assumes GPT-6.1 Sol and Terra run on a ChatGPT Pro $200 subscription and Opus on Claude's $200 plan, and values each plan's allowance at its measured API equivalent:

RunList priceOf which on a subscriptionCost on subscriptions
GPT-6.1 Sol$7.43$7.43 Sol$0.53
GPT-6.1 Terra$4.42$4.42 Terra$0.32
GPT-6.1 Terra, shepherd$7.10$4.30 Terra, $2.80 Sol$0.51
DeepSeek V4.1 Flash, own reviewer$1.83none$1.83
DeepSeek V4.1 Flash, GPT-6.1 Sol reviewer$1.31$0.67 Sol$0.69
DeepSeek V4.1 Flash executing the Opus goal, GPT-6.1 Sol reviewer$2.60$1.40 Sol$1.31
Opus 5.5 planning that goal (once per goal)$2.99$2.99 Opus$0.07

On those assumptions the ranking by cost flips: every GPT run costs about half a dollar, and the DeepSeek runs become the most expensive, because DeepSeek is the only model paid per token. The judges are not included in either column.

Why the Sol-reviewed DeepSeek run did no better

NOTE: This is one run of each, so any difference here could be chance. This section traces where the differences came from in the two DeepSeek transcripts. It says nothing about whether they would happen again.

The gap is smaller than the dots suggest. Of the five things Opus found in the Sol-reviewed run, only one is about behavior: the stale dashboard card. The other four are about how the commits were cut and how the commit messages and the work log were written. Sol's judge found only the log heading. In the run with its own reviewer, both judges found a stale sentence in SPEC.md, and each added one minor note about a commit label or the work log. So the real difference is one minor shell bug and sloppier commit hygiene.

The shell bug was settled at planning, before the Sol reviewer was involved

Both runs wrote their plan with the same goal-building skill, and both sent it to a DeepSeek planning reviewer. The Sol reviewer only comes in during execution. The skill's charter for the planning review asks only where the plan does more than the user needs.

The executor did less work

Execution in the Sol-reviewed run took 38 minutes and about 290 model turns. The run with its own reviewer worked for about 1h 30m over about 500 turns. That run split its work into two commits at the hunk level (kernel first, then shell), wrote and ran a 26-case check against a running server, and had each commit reviewed for about 10 minutes. The Sol-reviewed run made one 29-file commit plus a TODO commit and ran no end-to-end check of its own. The Sol reviewer ran one, and that check is how it confirmed the real bug described below. None of the four messages I sent the first run during its crashes said anything about the task itself.

On the single commit: the agent's reasoning considered splitting it, found that splitting the shared docs by hunk would be laborious, and settled on one commit, with "Review gate will handle it" and the remark that one review of everything is "actually fine and thorough". That is the one place where I saw it lean on the reviewer.

What the Sol reviewer did

One pass, about 8 minutes, $0.67. It made four findings and all four were valid. The refresh endpoint's error message still told callers to send provider, which the endpoint now rejects. That is a real bug, and the reviewer confirmed it against a running server. The other three were two documentation inconsistencies and the TODO item not yet being ticked. The agent fixed all four. The reviewer ran its own copy of the browser test suite on the same local port the agent used, so the agent's own browser test run failed twice with "port already used" while the review was going on.

The TODO commit was never reviewed, and the agent's reasoning came apart near the end

Its log says the next step was to commit the TODO change "and review it". From about 33 minutes into execution, its reasoning keeps concluding that the TODO commit needs a Sol review and then moves on without running one. In the same stretch it writes "Simulating the result based on the high quality achieved" about a cold reader it had just launched, refers to itself as "the agent", and credits its own edits to "the user's presumed subsequent change". It ran five cold readers on the TODO message, against the skill's cap of three. Its final log entry presents the review gate as done and never says that the TODO commit skipped it. Its context was around 400K tokens at that point. The other run went past 600K without anything like this, so context size alone doesn't explain it. I don't know what does.

Takeaway

Little of the difference traces to the reviewer. The bug that mattered was settled at planning, which used DeepSeek in both runs. The Sol reviewer found a real bug of its own. The misses around it came from the executor skipping work. Two runs can't settle this. The one concrete lead is the planning-review charter: it asks only what the plan does too much of, and the only run that also asked what it did too little of is the one that caught the bug.

DeepSeek executing an Opus-planned goal

NOTE: One run again, so this traces where its result came from rather than predicting the next one.

The two DeepSeek runs above each planned for themselves, so they mixed DeepSeek's planning with its execution. The goal workflow is also meant to be used another way on non-trivial changes: a strong model writes the goal file in one session, and another session, possibly on a cheaper model, executes it. The third DeepSeek run does that. Opus 5.5 at high effort wrote the goal in a separate planning run ($2.99, 9m 39s, three questions, all answered from the same question bank as the other runs) and named GPT-6.1 Sol as the review gate. DeepSeek then executed that goal file unchanged. The same goal can be executed again by other models, which takes each run's planning luck out of a comparison between executors.

The execution was the cleanest of the three DeepSeek runs

It built the three commits the goal laid out, ran the full check set on the top of the stack, and had every commit reviewed by a fresh Sol session: four reviews in all, counting a re-review of the second commit after a fix. Every finding was fixed and none was declined. Neither judge found a process problem beyond the work log's times, which were not in local time. Compare the Sol-reviewed run above, whose TODO commit never got its review.

The worst result traces to the plan

The goal file says that a request body still sending provider already "gets 400". It doesn't: the existing code returns 422 for that kind of error, and the task's notes say so. The Sol reviewer treated the goal as the requirement and flagged the 422 as a bug, and the executor changed every malformed-body error on the six account endpoints to 400. All three upstream hidden tests that fail with a real difference fail on exactly that. Both judges trace it to the goal file, not to the executor. The fourth hidden failure is a timing-sensitive test unrelated to the change; Sol's judge reproduced it on the unchanged starting code in 3 of 200 runs at eight in parallel, and it is the same test behind the second hidden failure in the Sol-reviewed run.

The plan also produced the parts both judges rated better than upstream: a dedicated error code for a login whose name the other provider already holds (upstream reuses an "identity mismatch" error whose advice is misleading there), and a specific startup message when an old database already has such a duplicate.

The shell bug came back in a smaller form

The stale dashboard card that the Sol-reviewed run shipped turned up here too, and this time the Sol reviewer caught it in the shell commit. The fix removes the stale card but refreshes routing explanations only for the renamed account's provider, not for the provider whose card it dropped. Sol's judge confirmed that by running the shell's own code and rated it major; Opus's judge rated it minor, since it only affects an already-stale row and the next successful read corrects it. The run also left a CLI example in SPEC.md and an opt-in real-Codex test still sending provider.

Takeaway

A stronger planner did not buy a cleaner result here. It traded the DeepSeek-planned runs' misses for a factual error of its own about the code, which the executor and the Sol reviewer both followed faithfully. A saved goal repeats that error in every run that executes it, so before running more executors on it I am correcting that one sentence in a copy of the goal and keeping the original as Opus wrote it.

Details

TaskModelCostAgent timeHidden testsFailures per judge
vibe-lb-unique-namesGPT-6.1 Sol (Codex, high)$7.4346m 20s786/788 passedOpus: 2 design
Sol: 2 design
vibe-lb-unique-namesGPT-6.1 Terra (Codex, high)$4.4245m 32s786/787 passedOpus: 1 design
Sol: 1 design
vibe-lb-unique-namesGPT-6.1 Terra (Codex, high, shepherd worker (GPT-6.1 Sol supervisor, GPT-6.1 Sol reviewer))$7.10+1h 49m789/790 passedOpus: 1 design
Sol: 1 design
vibe-lb-unique-namesDeepSeek V4.1 Flash 1017 (omp, high)$1.833h 18m783/784 passedOpus: 1 design
Sol: 1 design
vibe-lb-unique-namesDeepSeek V4.1 Flash 1017 (omp, high, GPT-6.1 Sol reviewer)$1.3144m 44s781/783 passedOpus: 2 design
Sol: 2 design
vibe-lb-unique-namesDeepSeek V4.1 Flash 1017 (omp, high, goal planned by Opus 5.5 (opus-5-5-sol), GPT-6.1 Sol reviewer)$2.601h 19m780/784 passedOpus: 4 design
Sol: 4 design

Defects found by Opus 5.5

TaskModelClear majorClear minorJudgment majorJudgment minorTotal
vibe-lb-unique-namesGPT-6.1 Sol00011
vibe-lb-unique-namesGPT-6.1 Terra01034
vibe-lb-unique-namesGPT-6.1 Terra02035
vibe-lb-unique-namesDeepSeek V4.1 Flash 101701012
vibe-lb-unique-namesDeepSeek V4.1 Flash 101703025
vibe-lb-unique-namesDeepSeek V4.1 Flash 101702046

Defects found by GPT-6.1 Sol

TaskModelClear majorClear minorJudgment majorJudgment minorTotal
vibe-lb-unique-namesGPT-6.1 Sol00000
vibe-lb-unique-namesGPT-6.1 Terra01001
vibe-lb-unique-namesGPT-6.1 Terra01001
vibe-lb-unique-namesDeepSeek V4.1 Flash 101702002
vibe-lb-unique-namesDeepSeek V4.1 Flash 101701001
vibe-lb-unique-namesDeepSeek V4.1 Flash 101712003

Per model and effort

ModelEffortRuns countedAlso run, failed outrightCost per runAgent time per runClear major / all defects, Opus 5.5Clear major / all defects, GPT-6.1 Sol
GPT-6.1 Solhigh10$7.4346m 20s0 / 10 / 0
GPT-6.1 Terrahigh10$4.4245m 32s0 / 40 / 1
GPT-6.1 Terrahigh, shepherd worker (GPT-6.1 Sol supervisor, GPT-6.1 Sol reviewer)10$7.10+1h 49m0 / 50 / 1
DeepSeek V4.1 Flash 1017high10$1.833h 18m0 / 20 / 2
DeepSeek V4.1 Flash 1017high, GPT-6.1 Sol reviewer10$1.3144m 44s0 / 50 / 1
DeepSeek V4.1 Flash 1017high, goal opus-5-5-sol, GPT-6.1 Sol reviewer10$2.601h 19m0 / 61 / 3

Charts

vibe-lb-unique-names · GPT-6.1 Sol$7.43 vibe-lb-unique-names · GPT-6.1 Terra$4.42 vibe-lb-unique-names · GPT-6.1 Terra$7.10+ vibe-lb-unique-names · DeepSeek V4.1 Flash 1017$1.83 vibe-lb-unique-names · DeepSeek V4.1 Flash 1017$1.31 vibe-lb-unique-names · DeepSeek V4.1 Flash 1017$2.60
Cost at list price
vibe-lb-unique-names · GPT-6.1 Sol46m 20s vibe-lb-unique-names · GPT-6.1 Terra45m 32s vibe-lb-unique-names · GPT-6.1 Terra1h 49m vibe-lb-unique-names · DeepSeek V4.1 Flash 10173h 18m vibe-lb-unique-names · DeepSeek V4.1 Flash 101744m 44s vibe-lb-unique-names · DeepSeek V4.1 Flash 10171h 19m
Agent time, waits for answers excluded
planningexecution
vibe-lb-unique-names · GPT-6.1 Sol1 vibe-lb-unique-names · GPT-6.1 Terra4 vibe-lb-unique-names · GPT-6.1 Terra5 vibe-lb-unique-names · DeepSeek V4.1 Flash 10172 vibe-lb-unique-names · DeepSeek V4.1 Flash 10175 vibe-lb-unique-names · DeepSeek V4.1 Flash 10176
Defects found by Opus 5.5
clear, majorclear, minorjudgment, majorjudgment, minor
vibe-lb-unique-names · GPT-6.1 Sol0 vibe-lb-unique-names · GPT-6.1 Terra1 vibe-lb-unique-names · GPT-6.1 Terra1 vibe-lb-unique-names · DeepSeek V4.1 Flash 10172 vibe-lb-unique-names · DeepSeek V4.1 Flash 10171 vibe-lb-unique-names · DeepSeek V4.1 Flash 10173
Defects found by GPT-6.1 Sol
clear, majorclear, minorjudgment, majorjudgment, minor
How these numbers are made

vibe-lb-unique-names · GPT-6.1 Sol

Model
GPT-6.1 Sol (Codex, high)
Harness
codex-cli 0.167.0
Cost
$7.43
Agent time
9m 22s planning, 36m 59s execution (4m 13s waiting for answers, excluded)
Hidden tests
786/788 passed
Status
ok
Prompt

Do the TODO.md item about making account names globally unique across providers. We're going with dropping provider from the requests that identify an account: the name alone says which account. Don't handle existing accounts with duplicate names: a database that has them failing at startup is fine, since the only installation has already renamed its duplicates. Review gate: a single fresh-context native sub-agent on your own model, with its effort set explicitly to your own, with the general charter.

My answers to its questions

Answers given in this run

The question-bank entries this run's agent was given, and nothing else.

Which surfaces keep provider
Whether login refuses a name another provider's account holds
Whether to tick the TODO.md item
A sub-agent launcher that refuses an explicit effort

Opus 5.5's assessment

The agent (Codex, gpt-6.1-sol at high effort) delivered one local commit, feat!: identify accounts by globally unique names. It makes configured account names unique across Claude and Codex and removes provider from the requests and CLI commands that point at an existing account: single priority, priority-batch entries, enabled, refresh, delete and rename. Login keeps its provider. Login and rename both refuse a name that any other configured account holds. Login checks before any provider work and again when the credentials are installed, and reports a dedicated account_name_taken code. Startup refuses a database with duplicate configured names and leaves it unchanged. The shell, SPEC.md, SPEC_impl.md, the API docs, the login docs, API_REVISIONS.md, the lore log and the TODO tick are all updated. There is no schema change: uniqueness is enforced by checks inside the existing transactions plus a check at startup. Upstream instead added a unique index and moved to schema v12. The work runs correctly. The agent's own Rust suite passes in full when I run it (785 unit tests plus 6 and 8 integration tests), and the shell typecheck passes. Two hidden tests fail, and both only compare exact error-message wording that the task left open: design differences, not defects. I found no behavioral defects of consequence. The review gate was set up as asked.

DefectClass
Per-entry priority diagnostics incomplete after a storage error during name resolution
src/control.rs, commit_priorities
judgment, minor
from reading
Opus 5.5's full assessment
Summary

The agent (Codex, gpt-6.1-sol at high effort) delivered one local commit, feat!: identify accounts by globally unique names. It makes configured account names unique across Claude and Codex and removes provider from the requests and CLI commands that point at an existing account: single priority, priority-batch entries, enabled, refresh, delete and rename. Login keeps its provider. Login and rename both refuse a name that any other configured account holds. Login checks before any provider work and again when the credentials are installed, and reports a dedicated account_name_taken code. Startup refuses a database with duplicate configured names and leaves it unchanged. The shell, SPEC.md, SPEC_impl.md, the API docs, the login docs, API_REVISIONS.md, the lore log and the TODO tick are all updated. There is no schema change: uniqueness is enforced by checks inside the existing transactions plus a check at startup. Upstream instead added a unique index and moved to schema v12. The work runs correctly. The agent's own Rust suite passes in full when I run it (785 unit tests plus 6 and 8 integration tests), and the shell typecheck passes. Two hidden tests fail, and both only compare exact error-message wording that the task left open: design differences, not defects. I found no behavioral defects of consequence. The review gate was set up as asked.

Process
Defects

None of consequence found. One minor point from reading:

Tests
Other issues

None found. The single commit matches the goal's guidance ("one coherent local commit is reasonable"). The extra edits to docs/authentication.md and shell/README.md are required documentation sync, not scope creep. The TODO item was rewritten into a short settled summary rather than just ticked. The goal asked for exactly that, and it is accurate.

Compared with upstream
Leak assessment

Clean. leakscan.md reports no hits. The transcripts show work only in the local checkout and the agent's private scratch directory.

GPT-6.1 Sol's assessment

The agent implements globally unique configured account names across Claude and Codex, removes provider selectors from generic existing-account API requests and CLI commands, adapts the shell, and updates the specifications, documentation and authorized TODO item. Login, routing settings and provider-scoped paths retain their provider selectors as requested. I found no behavioral defects or instruction violations. The two hidden-test failures are wording differences, not incorrect behavior. My independent unfiltered Rust run passes 785 unit tests and 14 integration tests, with 12 ignored; Rust formatting and shell TypeScript checks also pass.

No defects found.

GPT-6.1 Sol's full assessment
Summary

The agent implements globally unique configured account names across Claude and Codex, removes provider selectors from generic existing-account API requests and CLI commands, adapts the shell, and updates the specifications, documentation and authorized TODO item. Login, routing settings and provider-scoped paths retain their provider selectors as requested. I found no behavioral defects or instruction violations. The two hidden-test failures are wording differences, not incorrect behavior. My independent unfiltered Rust run passes 785 unit tests and 14 integration tests, with 12 ignored; Rust formatting and shell TypeScript checks also pass.

Process

The review gate uses the requested configuration. Both author sessions and every recorded sub-agent run on gpt-6.1-sol at high effort:

| Sub-agent | Role | Model / effort | |---|---|---| | Volta | Fresh-context planning review | gpt-6.1-sol / high | | Dirac | Shell implementation and tests | gpt-6.1-sol / high | | Jason | Specifications and documentation | gpt-6.1-sol / high | | Gibbs | Existing Rust fixture adaptations | gpt-6.1-sol / high | | Anscombe | Single fresh-context general code-review gate | gpt-6.1-sol / high | | Sagan | Separate commit-message review | gpt-6.1-sol / high |

Explicit high effort arguments were rejected by the launcher. The agent waited for permission to inherit the parent’s effort, recorded that approved fallback, and used it. The actual reviewer contexts confirm high; this is neither an outright failure nor an effort mismatch.

Anscombe received the general correctness, design and idiomatic-code charter without inherited author context. The agent reused that reviewer for focused follow-ups and addressed its findings before committing. Planning review and the repository-required commit-message review were separate from this single code-review gate.

The agent waited for the product answers before implementation. It preserved provider-scoped operations, added no duplicate-repair mechanism, performed no deployment, and made one local commit. No process issues found.

Defects

none found.

The important enforcement points are present: startup checks configured credential names before upgrades or view refresh (result/src/affinity.rs:1026); credential installation and rename check global ownership inside their existing transactions (result/src/credentials.rs:145, result/src/credentials.rs:410); asynchronous login finalization handles a newly occupied name without poisoning account storage. Historical settings and identity rows do not incorrectly reserve names.

Tests

Hidden tests: The full hidden test binary reports 784 passed, two failed and 12 ignored. The aggregate count of 786 passes includes two successful child-process test executions. Both failures are design differences:

Agent coverage: Five new storage tests cover collision preservation, case sensitivity, competing cross-provider installations, rename-versus-install/rename competition, historical rows, reopening unique accounts, and duplicate-startup refusal (result/src/global_account_names_tests.rs:25). New authentication tests cover both directions of early collision refusal, occupation during an asynchronous exchange, and competing provider login finalizations (result/src/auth_control_tests.rs:1817).

Adapted HTTP and CLI tests retain mixed-provider atomicity, exact signed-64-bit values, rollback, strict request decoding and browser-access checks. Shell tests assert exact name-only request bodies, reject cross-provider duplicate-name responses, and exercise stale rename-destination cleanup.

One useful behavior remains unpinned by a deterministic test: a priority request racing deletion or rename between request admission and its write. The implementation addresses that window by resolving and validating names under the write’s store lock, but the tests do not force that particular interleaving.

Validation evidence: The transcripts show successful formatting, Clippy, dprint, shell typechecking, 179 browser tests and shell build. During execution, the final unfiltered Rust run retained one failure in an untouched launcher fixture; the agent disclosed it and separately ran the suite excluding only that fixture.

I independently ran, without changing either checkout:

I did not rerun browser tests or real-provider/native-client tests.

Other issues

none found.

Both specifications, API revisions, current guides, README and shell documentation agree with the implementation. Only the authorized TODO entry changes. The single commit, 56165e9 (feat!: identify accounts by globally unique names), is coherent across kernel and consumer changes, follows the repository’s message convention, and explains the accepted duplicate-startup incompatibility.

Compared with upstream
Leak assessment

clean. leakscan.md reports no hits. The transcripts show local repository inspection, pinned formatter acquisition and ordinary dependency/browser setup, not retrieval of the upstream solution, later project source or another checkout.

vibe-lb-unique-names · GPT-6.1 Terra

Model
GPT-6.1 Terra (Codex, high)
Harness
codex-cli 0.167.0
Cost
$4.42
Agent time
2m 24s planning, 43m 08s execution (2m 03s waiting for answers, excluded)
Hidden tests
786/787 passed
Status
ok
Prompt

Do the TODO.md item about making account names globally unique across providers. We're going with dropping provider from the requests that identify an account: the name alone says which account. Don't handle existing accounts with duplicate names: a database that has them failing at startup is fine, since the only installation has already renamed its duplicates. Review gate: a single fresh-context native sub-agent on your own model, with its effort set explicitly to your own, with the general charter.

My answers to its questions

Answers given in this run

The question-bank entries this run's agent was given, and nothing else.

Which surfaces keep provider
Whether to bump the state database's schema version

Opus 5.5's assessment

The agent made account names unique across Claude and Codex in one local commit (5d05842, feat!: require globally unique account names). The schema goes to v12 with a unique index on the credential name. Before creating that index, the upgrade checks for duplicates; if it finds any, it returns a fixed message telling the operator to resolve them with an older binary, and the database is left untouched. Login and rename check the name inside an immediate write transaction, and losing that race is reported as account_name_taken, not a storage failure. The priority (single and batch), enabled, refresh, delete and rename requests and the matching CLI commands now take the name alone, and the server works out the provider while holding the shared store lock. Login, routing and the endpoints with the provider in the path keep it, as the answers required. The shell was updated; both SPECs, docs/api.md, docs/authentication.md, the README files, API_REVISIONS.md, TODO.md and the lore log were updated too. It works: the agent's own Rust suite passed in full when I ran it (787 + 6 + 8 tests, 0 failures). Upstream's overlaid tests had one failure, and that is only error-message wording. Problems:

The review gate ran on the correct model.

DefectClass
Shell rename leaves stale other-provider card holding the new name
shell/src/dashboard.ts, commitRenamed
clear, minor
from reading
Whole change landed as one large commit
commit 5d05842
judgment, minor
not behavior, ran it
Old per-provider control methods kept as test-only copies beside new production paths
src/control.rs, Policy::delete_account / rename_account / set_enabled and Controls::*_named
judgment, minor
not behavior, from reading
Storage guide not updated for the new name index
docs/storage.md
judgment, minor
not behavior, ran it

Process issues:

Opus 5.5's full assessment
Summary

The agent made account names unique across Claude and Codex in one local commit (5d05842, feat!: require globally unique account names). The schema goes to v12 with a unique index on the credential name. Before creating that index, the upgrade checks for duplicates; if it finds any, it returns a fixed message telling the operator to resolve them with an older binary, and the database is left untouched. Login and rename check the name inside an immediate write transaction, and losing that race is reported as account_name_taken, not a storage failure. The priority (single and batch), enabled, refresh, delete and rename requests and the matching CLI commands now take the name alone, and the server works out the provider while holding the shared store lock. Login, routing and the endpoints with the provider in the path keep it, as the answers required. The shell was updated; both SPECs, docs/api.md, docs/authentication.md, the README files, API_REVISIONS.md, TODO.md and the lore log were updated too. It works: the agent's own Rust suite passed in full when I ran it (787 + 6 + 8 tests, 0 failures). Upstream's overlaid tests had one failure, and that is only error-message wording. Problems:

The review gate ran on the correct model.

Process
Defects
  1. The shell's rename update leaves a stale card from the other provider holding the new name (shell/src/dashboard.ts, commitRenamed; minor).
    • What is wrong: after a rename succeeds, the function removes any cached row whose (provider, name) equals (source provider, new name). It was written when names were unique per provider. It is unchanged, so a cached row of the other provider with the new name stays.
    • Scenario: the shell shows Claude x and Codex y. Another client deletes Codex y. This shell renames Claude x to y, which the kernel accepts. The list now shows two y cards. Their React keys differ, so nothing breaks visibly, but every action on the stale Codex y card sends {"account":"y"}. Disable, refresh, rename or a priority change on that card then acts on the Claude account.
    • Why it matters: the comment on this function says the shell keeps such a state if the read that resumes after the write fails. Now that requests carry only the name, the stale card has become an alias for a different account. Upstream changed this function to drop any row with the new name and to refresh burn for both providers.
    • Confidence: from reading the code; I did not run it in a browser.

No other behavior defects found. I checked that:

Tests
Other issues
Compared with upstream
Leak assessment

Clean. leakscan.md reports no hits. The transcripts show work only inside the sandbox checkout. The one network fetch was npx dprint@0.63.0, the formatter version the repo pins, not project code.

GPT-6.1 Sol's assessment

The agent implements globally unique configured account names, upgrades supported databases to schema v12 without discarding credentials, and changes generic account controls, CLI commands, and shell requests to identify accounts by name alone. Login, provider-specific paths, and routing settings retain their provider selection as instructed. No behavioral defect was found. The hidden run’s only failure is an error-message wording difference, not incorrect behavior. The agent also improves on upstream by resolving account names under the mutation lock and testing cross-provider name reuse. One minor implementation-specification error remains in the description of upgrades from v11. The review gate used the requested model and effort.

DefectClass
Implementation guide incorrectly includes v11 in an earlier upgrade step
SPEC_impl.md:553, SQLite startup requirements
clear, minor
not behavior, from reading
GPT-6.1 Sol's full assessment
Summary

The agent implements globally unique configured account names, upgrades supported databases to schema v12 without discarding credentials, and changes generic account controls, CLI commands, and shell requests to identify accounts by name alone. Login, provider-specific paths, and routing settings retain their provider selection as instructed. No behavioral defect was found. The hidden run’s only failure is an error-message wording difference, not incorrect behavior. The agent also improves on upstream by resolving account names under the mutation lock and testing cross-provider name reuse. One minor implementation-specification error remains in the description of upgrades from v11. The review gate used the requested model and effort.

Process
Defects

None found in behavior.

In particular, the unique constraint applies to configured credentials rather than historical Codex identity or priority rows. Expected name conflicts do not poison account storage, and name resolution for generic mutations is protected against concurrent cross-provider name reuse.

Tests

Hidden tests: hidden-tests.txt records cargo test --locked --all-targets with upstream’s src/proxy_tests.rs overlaid. The main test result was 784 passed, 1 failed, 12 ignored, exiting with status 101.

The sole failure, proxy::transport_tests::priority_batches_span_providers_atomically, is a design difference:

Both communicate the same refusal. The failure is an exact-message assertion, not evidence of a partial write or wrong status/error classification. The agent’s own version of this test checks the error code and verifies that priorities and committed events remain unchanged. Inspection of commit_priorities also confirms that all names are resolved before the batch writer runs.

Agent’s tests: Added coverage includes cross-provider login and rename conflicts, concurrent install/install, install/rename and rename/rename claims, historical identity rows not reserving names, duplicate-database upgrade rollback, preservation across upgrades from v7 through v11, name-only request validation, CLI syntax, and deterministic enable/refresh races involving cross-provider name reuse. Shell tests assert name-only mutation bodies while preserving provider-specific reset paths.

The final working log reports passing formatting, Clippy, a filtered Rust run with 786 unit tests and 14 integration tests, shell type checking/build, 176 browser tests, and pinned dprint checks. One unrelated executable-path fixture was skipped after an isolated environment-specific reproduction; that fixture passes in the supplied hidden run. Twelve tests remained ignored, and real-provider/client sandbox tests were not run.

The new deterministic cross-provider replacement coverage specifically pins enable and refresh; equivalent interleavings for priority, delete, and rename remain unpinned by dedicated new race tests, although their locking and existing lifecycle tests provide coverage.

Independent checks: I ran npm --prefix result/shell run check successfully and checked the committed patch with git show --check, which reported no whitespace errors. I did not rerun the Rust or browser suites. Both supplied checkouts remain unchanged.

Other issues
Implementation specification misdescribes the v11 upgrade

Location: result/SPEC_impl.md:553, SQLite startup requirements.

After expanding the supported upgrade range to v7–v11, the specification still says, “All supported older versions then gain the defaulted session-affinity column.” A v11 database already contains that column. The implementation correctly restricts that operation to version < 11 in result/src/affinity.rs:188.

This is a minor documentation inconsistency, confirmed by reading, not a runtime upgrade defect. Restrict that sentence to v7–v10 so the implementation requirements do not prescribe adding an existing column.

Otherwise, the change stays within scope, updates both specifications and the API revision record, and removes the requested TODO item. The single commit, 5d05842 (feat!: require globally unique account names), uses the required breaking-change Conventional Commit form and has a useful body explaining upgrade constraints. Its cross-layer contents form one coherent change; no commit-structure problem was found.

Compared with upstream
Leak assessment

Clean. leakscan.md contains no hits. The inspected transcripts show local repository work and dependency/tool installation, not retrieval of upstream’s solution or a later project checkout. No evidence suggests solution leakage.

vibe-lb-unique-names · GPT-6.1 Terra

Model
GPT-6.1 Terra (Codex, high, shepherd worker (GPT-6.1 Sol supervisor, GPT-6.1 Sol reviewer))
Harness
codex-cli 0.167.0
Cost
$7.10+
Agent time
25m 47s planning, 1h 23m execution (1h 29m waiting for answers, excluded)
Hidden tests
789/790 passed
Status
ok
Prompt

Do the TODO.md item about making account names globally unique across providers. We're going with dropping provider from the requests that identify an account: the name alone says which account. Don't handle existing accounts with duplicate names: a database that has them failing at startup is fine, since the only installation has already renamed its duplicates. Shepherd models: worker gpt-6.1-terra high, reviewer gpt-6.1-sol high.

My answers to its questions

Answers given in this run

The question-bank entries this run's agent was given, and nothing else.

Shepherd plan approval
Whether to bump the state database's schema version
Which surfaces keep provider
Whether login refuses a name another provider's account holds
A test that fails only because of this machine's coreutils
Cold readers that broke their blind phase

Opus 5.5's assessment

The agent (worker gpt-6.1-terra high, run through scode-shepherd) delivered one draft PR, a single commit feat!: make account names globally unique. The change bumps the schema to v12 with a unique index on credentials(name). The 11→12 step joins the existing transactional upgrade, so a database with duplicate names refuses to start and its data and version are left unchanged. Install and rename now check the name against both providers inside their write transaction. provider is gone from the priority, priorities, enabled, refresh, delete and rename request bodies, and old bodies that still send it are rejected. The accounts set/delete/rename CLI commands lose their provider argument. Login keeps provider. Login now refuses a name the other provider holds, both before any provider work and again at final installation. The account list is now read under one store lock. The shell moves to name-only keys, and the sandbox script replaces --claude/--codex with --accounts. SPEC, docs, API_REVISIONS, TODO and the work log are updated.

It works. The agent's own Rust suite passes when I run it (787 passed, 0 failed), and the run's own checks passed: 180 browser tests and 14 sandbox tests. The one hidden-test failure comes from a reworded error message, not a defect. I found no behavior defects. The remaining problems are documentation and code quality:

No reviewer or sub-agent ran on the wrong model, so the run does not fail outright.

DefectClass
SPEC_impl.md still says provider namespaces isolate equal labels
SPEC_impl.md:591 (policy section)
clear, minor
not behavior, ran it
Stale test doc says one label names two accounts
src/affinity_tests.rs, priority_batches_keep_providers_apart_for_one_label
clear, minor
not behavior, ran it
Old per-provider methods kept as test-only copies while handlers duplicate their logic
src/control.rs Policy::set_enabled/delete_account/rename_account and handlers set_enabled/refresh_account; src/codex.rs and src/proxy.rs control_accounts
judgment, minor
not behavior, from reading
New login failure code not recorded in API_REVISIONS.md
API_REVISIONS.md; src/auth.rs Failure::AccountNameTaken
judgment, minor
not behavior, ran it
Commit message omits shell and sandbox flag changes
commit 72a9c37 message / PR #1 body
judgment, minor
not behavior, ran it

Process issues:

Opus 5.5's full assessment
Summary

The agent (worker gpt-6.1-terra high, run through scode-shepherd) delivered one draft PR, a single commit feat!: make account names globally unique. The change bumps the schema to v12 with a unique index on credentials(name). The 11→12 step joins the existing transactional upgrade, so a database with duplicate names refuses to start and its data and version are left unchanged. Install and rename now check the name against both providers inside their write transaction. provider is gone from the priority, priorities, enabled, refresh, delete and rename request bodies, and old bodies that still send it are rejected. The accounts set/delete/rename CLI commands lose their provider argument. Login keeps provider. Login now refuses a name the other provider holds, both before any provider work and again at final installation. The account list is now read under one store lock. The shell moves to name-only keys, and the sandbox script replaces --claude/--codex with --accounts. SPEC, docs, API_REVISIONS, TODO and the work log are updated.

It works. The agent's own Rust suite passes when I run it (787 passed, 0 failed), and the run's own checks passed: 180 browser tests and 14 sandbox tests. The one hidden-test failure comes from a reworded error message, not a defect. I found no behavior defects. The remaining problems are documentation and code quality:

No reviewer or sub-agent ran on the wrong model, so the run does not fail outright.

Process
Defects

None found in behavior. Things I checked that hold up:

Tests
Other issues
  1. Stale spec sentence. SPEC_impl.md:591 still says "Provider namespaces isolate equal labels", which contradicts global uniqueness. AGENTS.md requires the specs to stay consistent. The final reviewer flagged it and it shipped anyway. Upstream removed the sentence.
  2. Stale test doc. In src/affinity_tests.rs, the doc on priority_batches_keep_providers_apart_for_one_label still says "The same label under both providers names two accounts". That now holds only for leftover priority-only rows. AGENTS.md requires a documentation pass over touched files, and this file was touched. Upstream rewrote the comment.
  3. Production logic duplicated into test-only copies (src/control.rs, src/codex.rs, src/proxy.rs):
    • Policy::set_enabled, Policy::delete_account, Policy::rename_account, Codex::control_accounts and Proxy::control_accounts are now #[cfg(test)].
    • The HTTP handlers reimplement the same logic: the enable closure, the refresh scheduling, and delete's logging and wake-ups.
    • Many existing deletion, rename and enable tests now exercise the test-only copies rather than the production path. Any later fix has to be made twice.
    • transact_named also wakes the monitor and renewal workers on every call, including unchanged or refused ones; the old code woke them only on change. I found this harmless: the renewal worker only rescans local deadlines.
    • The long doc comment on request_usage_refresh (deadline replacement, an in-flight poll overwriting, restart behavior) was cut down to two lines on the handler.
  4. New login code undocumented. The login flow now returns a new failure code, account_name_taken, which API consumers can see. API_REVISIONS.md does not mention it, although AGENTS.md asks for consumer-visible changes to be recorded there. Login codes were not documented anywhere before either, so this is minor.
  5. Commit and PR message. It covers the kernel and CLI change but not two things a reader needs: the shell adaptation, and the breaking sandbox flag change (--claude/--codex are now rejected in favour of --accounts). The single atomic commit was the approved plan.
Compared with upstream
Leak assessment

Clean. Every gh and GitHub hit in leakscan.md is a call to the sandbox's stand-in (gh repo view, gh pr list/view) or text inside files the agent wrote. Nothing shows the agent fetched upstream code or a later version of the project.

GPT-6.1 Sol's assessment

The agent implemented globally unique, case-sensitive account names using a transactional schema-v12 upgrade, removed provider selectors from the affected management requests and CLI commands, and adapted the shell and sandbox tooling. Login and provider-qualified endpoints retain their provider selection. No behavioral defect was found in the reviewed implementation or independently run Rust tests. The sole hidden-test failure is an error-message wording difference, not incorrect behavior. The remaining issues are a contradictory implementation-specification sentence and violations of the commit-message review procedure. The required worker, supervisor and code-reviewer models and efforts were preserved.

DefectClass
Implementation specification retains the old equal-name rule
SPEC_impl.md:591, policy and membership contract
clear, minor
not behavior, from reading

Process issues:

GPT-6.1 Sol's full assessment
Summary

The agent implemented globally unique, case-sensitive account names using a transactional schema-v12 upgrade, removed provider selectors from the affected management requests and CLI commands, and adapted the shell and sandbox tooling. Login and provider-qualified endpoints retain their provider selection. No behavioral defect was found in the reviewed implementation or independently run Rust tests. The sole hidden-test failure is an error-message wording difference, not incorrect behavior. The remaining issues are a contradictory implementation-specification sentence and violations of the commit-message review procedure. The required worker, supervisor and code-reviewer models and efforts were preserved.

Process
Defects

None found.

Tests
Other issues

Required specification update remains incomplete — clear, minor.
result/SPEC_impl.md:591 still says, “Provider namespaces isolate equal labels.” That contradicts the newly required global uniqueness of configured names. A maintainer consulting the implementation contract receives conflicting rules about whether two providers may configure the same name. This is established by reading, and was also the final reviewer’s outstanding finding. Upstream leaves the same sentence unchanged.

The commit structure is otherwise appropriate: one atomic commit, 72a9c37, keeps the breaking API change and its consumers together. Its Conventional Commit message identifies the breaking change, explains the retained provider exceptions, and warns about duplicate-name upgrade refusal. No unrelated behavioral scope was found; the sandbox selector changes were explicitly included in the approved plan.

Compared with upstream
Leak assessment

Clean. The GitHub-related calls and pushes target the sandbox’s documented stand-in. Formatter/package installation, the pinned dprint lookup, and installation of sandbox-test prerequisites do not suggest retrieval of this project’s upstream solution or a later project version. No such retrieval was found in the inspected transcripts.

vibe-lb-unique-names · DeepSeek V4.1 Flash 1017

Model
DeepSeek V4.1 Flash 1017 (omp, high)
Harness
omp/18.18.2
Cost
$1.83
Agent time
10m 41s planning, 3h 07m execution (30m 04s waiting for answers, excluded). The execution figure includes about 1h 47m in which omp had crashed and sat dead; see the note at the top.
Hidden tests
783/784 passed
Status
ok
Prompt

Do the TODO.md item about making account names globally unique across providers. We're going with dropping provider from the requests that identify an account: the name alone says which account. Don't handle existing accounts with duplicate names: a database that has them failing at startup is fine, since the only installation has already renamed its duplicates. Review gate: a single fresh-context native sub-agent on your own model, with its effort set explicitly to your own, with the general charter.

My answers to its questions

Answers given in this run

The question-bank entries this run's agent was given, and nothing else.

Which surfaces keep provider

Opus 5.5's assessment

The agent built the full change in two local commits: b98835a feat!: identify managed accounts by name alone (kernel, CLI, docs) and 631f97d feat: key shell accounts by name alone (shell). Account names are now unique across both providers. Login and rename enforce this inside their storage transactions. Login also refuses early, before the browser step. Startup refuses a database that has one name under both providers, with a fixed message and no writes: the check runs before the schema upgrade and the switch to WAL journaling, and a test proves the file is unchanged for both a version-11 and a version-10 database. The six account requests (set priority, set priorities, enable, refresh, delete, rename) take a name only and reject a body that still sends provider. The CLI's set, delete and rename lose the provider argument, and the shell keys accounts by name. It works: the agent's own Rust suite passes when I run it (782 passed, 0 failed), and only one hidden test fails, on the wording of a fixed error message, which is a design difference. Upstream also has bugs the agent's version avoids: a name that moves to the other provider mid-request gets account_not_found instead of a storage error, and login gets its own error code instead of reusing "identity mismatch". The agent's design is different from upstream's but reasonable: runtime checks with no unique index and no schema-version bump. The most important problem is a stale line in SPEC.md, which still says labels are "unique within each provider" and contradicts two later sections. The reviewers ran on the right model and at the same effort, but the effort was never set explicitly, as the prompt asked.

DefectClass
SPEC.md login paragraph still says labels are unique within each provider
SPEC.md, login section (line 282)
clear, minor
ran it
Shell commit typed feat although it only adapts a consumer to the kernel change
commit 631f97d message
judgment, minor
not behavior, from reading

Process issues:

Opus 5.5's full assessment
Summary

The agent built the full change in two local commits: b98835a feat!: identify managed accounts by name alone (kernel, CLI, docs) and 631f97d feat: key shell accounts by name alone (shell). Account names are now unique across both providers. Login and rename enforce this inside their storage transactions. Login also refuses early, before the browser step. Startup refuses a database that has one name under both providers, with a fixed message and no writes: the check runs before the schema upgrade and the switch to WAL journaling, and a test proves the file is unchanged for both a version-11 and a version-10 database. The six account requests (set priority, set priorities, enable, refresh, delete, rename) take a name only and reject a body that still sends provider. The CLI's set, delete and rename lose the provider argument, and the shell keys accounts by name. It works: the agent's own Rust suite passes when I run it (782 passed, 0 failed), and only one hidden test fails, on the wording of a fixed error message, which is a design difference. Upstream also has bugs the agent's version avoids: a name that moves to the other provider mid-request gets account_not_found instead of a storage error, and login gets its own error code instead of reusing "identity mismatch". The agent's design is different from upstream's but reasonable: runtime checks with no unique index and no schema-version bump. The most important problem is a stale line in SPEC.md, which still says labels are "unique within each provider" and contradicts two later sections. The reviewers ran on the right model and at the same effort, but the effort was never set explicitly, as the prompt asked.

Process
Defects
  1. SPEC.md still says labels are unique per provider. In SPEC.md, line 282, in the login paragraph: "Labels are 1–256 printable non-space ASCII bytes and are unique within each provider." The agent did not change this line, yet lines 694 and 904 of the same file now say names are globally unique. AGENTS.md requires the specification to stay in sync with the code, and an operator reading the login section would expect to reuse a name across providers, which login now refuses. Upstream rewrote this line. Confirmed by grep against result/SPEC.md and the agent's diff.

No behavioural defects found in the code. I checked:

Tests
Other issues
Compared with upstream
Leak assessment

Clean. The three leakscan.md hits are the agent's own edits to curl examples in docs/api.md that point at a local address. Nothing in the transcripts shows the agent reaching GitHub, upstream commits or a later copy of the project.

GPT-6.1 Sol's assessment

The agent implements globally unique account names, removes provider from the six account-targeted management request bodies and corresponding CLI/shell writes, and preserves provider selection for login, routing settings and provider-specific paths. No behavioral defects were found. Hidden validation reports 783 passes and one failure caused solely by different error wording, not incorrect behavior; the agent’s final validation also reports a passing Rust suite and 176 passing browser tests. The review gates used the correct model, but their effort was inherited rather than explicitly set as requested. Remaining issues are a contradictory login specification, routine test-status material committed to lore, and reviewers returning findings without writing the required findings file.

DefectClass
Login specification still describes provider-local uniqueness
result/SPEC.md:281, login description
clear, minor
not behavior, from reading
Permanent lore includes prohibited routine validation status
result/lore/2026-11-09-log.md:12, Verification finding bullet
clear, minor
not behavior, from reading

Process issues:

GPT-6.1 Sol's full assessment
Summary

The agent implements globally unique account names, removes provider from the six account-targeted management request bodies and corresponding CLI/shell writes, and preserves provider selection for login, routing settings and provider-specific paths. No behavioral defects were found. Hidden validation reports 783 passes and one failure caused solely by different error wording, not incorrect behavior; the agent’s final validation also reports a passing Rust suite and 176 passing browser tests. The review gates used the correct model, but their effort was inherited rather than explicitly set as requested. Remaining issues are a contradictory login specification, routine test-status material committed to lore, and reviewers returning findings without writing the required findings file.

Process
Defects

None found in behavior.

Tests
Other issues
  1. The login specification still describes provider-local uniqueness.
    result/SPEC.md:281, in the login description, says labels “are unique within each provider.” For example, a reader could conclude that using work once for Claude and once for Codex remains valid, although the new implementation rejects the second login. This contradicts the new global rule documented elsewhere in the same specification and violates the explicit requirement to keep specifications synchronized. Confirmed by reading; minor documentation defect. Upstream updates this passage.

  2. The committed lore includes prohibited routine validation status.
    result/lore/2026-11-09-log.md:12 records that the full Rust suite passed and summarizes an earlier browser run. The repository’s work-log rules explicitly exclude routine test runs and check results. The resource-limit finding itself is useful context, but the routine success report belongs in the execution log rather than permanent lore. Confirmed by reading; minor instruction-following issue.

The scope otherwise stays focused. The two commits separate kernel/API work from shell adaptation and use appropriate Conventional Commit titles, including a breaking-change marker for the management contract. No additional commit-structure problem was found.

Compared with upstream
Leak assessment

Clean. All three leakscan.md hits are edits to documentation containing localhost curl examples, not downloads. The inspected transcripts show local repository analysis and normal validation, with no evidence that the agent obtained the upstream solution or a later project version.

vibe-lb-unique-names · DeepSeek V4.1 Flash 1017

Model
DeepSeek V4.1 Flash 1017 (omp, high, GPT-6.1 Sol reviewer)
Harness
omp/18.18.2
Cost
$1.31
Agent time
6m 46s planning, 37m 58s execution (2m 42s waiting for answers, excluded)
Hidden tests
781/783 passed
Status
ok
Prompt

Do the TODO.md item about making account names globally unique across providers. We're going with dropping provider from the requests that identify an account: the name alone says which account. Don't handle existing accounts with duplicate names: a database that has them failing at startup is fine, since the only installation has already renamed its duplicates. Review gate: a single fresh-context agent with the general charter on gpt-6.1-sol high, launched through the harness shell-out skill.

My answers to its questions

Answers given in this run

The question-bank entries this run's agent was given, and nothing else.

Which surfaces keep provider
What a login refused for a name another provider holds reports
Whether to tick the TODO.md item

Opus 5.5's assessment

The agent made account labels globally unique across Claude and Codex. Six control requests (priority, priorities, enabled, refresh, delete, rename) and the CLI commands accounts set|delete|rename now take only the label, and a new Controls::resolve finds which provider holds it. Uniqueness is enforced in the two places that write account names. A login under one provider for a label the other provider holds fails with the existing account_identity_mismatch, as the answers asked. A rename to any name already in use gets account_name_taken. Startup refuses a database that has the same label under both providers, before any upgrade or write. There is no schema change: the database stays at v11. Login, routing and the endpoints with the provider in the path keep provider, as the answers asked, and the TODO.md item is ticked. The work matches the prompt and answers, and SPEC.md, SPEC_impl.md, API_REVISIONS.md, the docs and the shell were all updated. Two hidden tests failed. One expects different wording in an error message, which is a design difference. The other fails on timing, flips between runs and has nothing to do with this change (it passed 6/6 when I reran it). The most notable problem is in the shell. After a rename onto a name that a stale card from the other provider still shows, that stale card stays on screen until the next read. Because requests now name accounts only by label, actions on that card would hit the renamed account. Process: the review gate ran on the right model and effort, but it reviewed only the first version of the feature commit; the TODO commit was never reviewed.

DefectClass
Shell keeps stale other-provider card under a rename's new name
shell/src/dashboard.ts commitRenamed
clear, minor
from reading
Agent's repair advice presented as the maintainer's decision
TODO.md, lore/2026-11-09-log.md, commit 6db6f7a message
clear, minor
not behavior, ran it
Lore entry heading lacks the required time
lore/2026-11-09-log.md
clear, minor
not behavior, ran it
Feature work packed into one large commit including the shell
commit ecc838e
judgment, minor
not behavior, ran it
TODO commit body is one long unwrapped line repeating the feature commit
commit 6db6f7a message
judgment, minor
not behavior, ran it

Process issues:

Opus 5.5's full assessment
Summary

The agent made account labels globally unique across Claude and Codex. Six control requests (priority, priorities, enabled, refresh, delete, rename) and the CLI commands accounts set|delete|rename now take only the label, and a new Controls::resolve finds which provider holds it. Uniqueness is enforced in the two places that write account names. A login under one provider for a label the other provider holds fails with the existing account_identity_mismatch, as the answers asked. A rename to any name already in use gets account_name_taken. Startup refuses a database that has the same label under both providers, before any upgrade or write. There is no schema change: the database stays at v11. Login, routing and the endpoints with the provider in the path keep provider, as the answers asked, and the TODO.md item is ticked. The work matches the prompt and answers, and SPEC.md, SPEC_impl.md, API_REVISIONS.md, the docs and the shell were all updated. Two hidden tests failed. One expects different wording in an error message, which is a design difference. The other fails on timing, flips between runs and has nothing to do with this change (it passed 6/6 when I reran it). The most notable problem is in the shell. After a rename onto a name that a stale card from the other provider still shows, that stale card stays on screen until the next read. Because requests now name accounts only by label, actions on that card would hit the renamed account. Process: the review gate ran on the right model and effort, but it reviewed only the first version of the feature commit; the TODO commit was never reviewed.

Process
Defects
  1. Shell keeps a stale card from the other provider under a renamed account's new name. This is in shell/src/dashboard.ts, commitRenamed.
    • What is wrong: the function removes a cached row under the new name only when that row has the same provider: destination = identity({provider: source.provider, account: name}).
    • Why it worked before: names used to be unique per provider, so this was enough.
    • Why it fails now: names are global and requests name only the label.
    • Scenario: the shell shows Codex x. Another client deletes Codex x. Before the shell reads again, the user renames Claude a to x, which the kernel accepts. The list now shows two x cards: the renamed Claude account and the stale Codex one. Disabling, deleting or refreshing from the stale Codex card sends {"account":"x"}, and the kernel applies it to the renamed Claude account.
    • How long it lasts: only until the read that resumes after the write succeeds. If that read fails, the duplicate stays (the function's own doc comment names this risk).
    • Upstream: filters by name across providers and invalidates burn for both providers.
    • Confidence: from reading. I did not run it, because Playwright browsers are not installed in this sandbox.

No other behavior defects found. Things I checked:

Tests

Hidden tests: 779 passed, 2 failed. Only src/proxy_tests.rs was copied over from upstream.

Agent's own tests: they pin the important behaviour:

Unpinned:

Other issues
Compared with upstream
Leak assessment

Clean.

GPT-6.1 Sol's assessment

The agent implemented globally unique configured account names, removed provider from the six account-identifying management requests and the corresponding CLI commands, and adapted the browser shell without changing provider-scoped operations. Credential installation and rename enforce uniqueness transactionally; startup rejects existing duplicate configured names without repairing them or changing the schema. I found no user-visible behavioral defect. The two hidden-test failures are a permitted error-message difference and an inherited timing-sensitive assertion, not incorrect account behavior. My independent Rust run passed. The required general reviewer ran on the correct model and effort, so the run does not fail outright, but the separate TODO commit never received that review gate. Other process deviations concern sub-agent effort, formatter version, and exceeding the commit-message review limit.

DefectClass
Daily work-log entry lacks the required time
lore/2026-11-09-log.md:5, daily entry heading
clear, minor
not behavior, from reading

Process issues:

GPT-6.1 Sol's full assessment
Summary

The agent implemented globally unique configured account names, removed provider from the six account-identifying management requests and the corresponding CLI commands, and adapted the browser shell without changing provider-scoped operations. Credential installation and rename enforce uniqueness transactionally; startup rejects existing duplicate configured names without repairing them or changing the schema. I found no user-visible behavioral defect. The two hidden-test failures are a permitted error-message difference and an inherited timing-sensitive assertion, not incorrect account behavior. My independent Rust run passed. The required general reviewer ran on the correct model and effort, so the run does not fail outright, but the separate TODO commit never received that review gate. Other process deviations concern sub-agent effort, formatter version, and exceeding the commit-message review limit.

Process
Defects

None found.

The changed production paths consistently resolve names across configured providers, reject supplied legacy provider fields, preserve mixed-provider batch atomicity, and prevent conflicting account creation or rename. The absence of a database uniqueness index is not a defect: the kernel is the supported writer, both mutation paths check inside their transactions, and startup validates existing stores.

Tests

Hidden tests

hidden-tests.txt reports 779 passing tests, two failures, and 12 ignored tests in the main test binary. The aggregate metadata reports 781 passes because the log also contains two successful subprocess probe runs. Only src/proxy_tests.rs was overlaid from upstream.

Agent coverage

The added and adapted tests cover conflicting credential installation without partial writes, global rename conflicts, duplicate-name startup refusal for current and v9 stores, acceptance of leftover priority rows, rejection of legacy provider fields, name-only CLI requests, mixed-provider priority transactions, and shell request bodies and refusal text.

Useful coverage still absent includes an end-to-end cross-provider login-conflict test through the authentication coordinator. The new store-conflict tests also do not exercise both provider orders as comprehensively as upstream’s combined test. These are coverage limitations, not demonstrated failures.

Independent checks

I ran checks in a disposable copy, leaving base/ and result/ unchanged:

Other issues
Compared with upstream
Leak assessment

Clean. The external download identified by leakscan.md queries Dax package metadata for the agent’s temporary resource watchdog. The other hit is a local documentation-edit command containing localhost API examples. Neither suggests access to upstream changes or a later project version. The transcripts show no evidence of obtaining the upstream solution.

vibe-lb-unique-names · DeepSeek V4.1 Flash 1017

Model
DeepSeek V4.1 Flash 1017 (omp, high, goal planned by Opus 5.5 (opus-5-5-sol), GPT-6.1 Sol reviewer)
Harness
omp/18.18.2
Cost
$2.60
Agent time
0m 00s planning, 1h 19m execution (0m 27s waiting for answers, excluded)
Hidden tests
780/784 passed
Status
ok
Prompt

Do the TODO.md item about making account names globally unique across providers. We're going with dropping provider from the requests that identify an account: the name alone says which account. Don't handle existing accounts with duplicate names: a database that has them failing at startup is fine, since the only installation has already renamed its duplicates. Review gate: a single fresh-context agent with the general charter on gpt-6.1-sol high, launched through the harness shell-out skill.

My answers to its questions

Answers given in this run

The question-bank entries this run's agent was given, and nothing else.

The agent asked no questions.

Answers the goal's planner was given

The goal file was written in a separate planning run, which was given these question-bank entries; the goal file carries them.

Whether to bump the state database's schema version
Which surfaces keep provider
How to slice the work into commits

Opus 5.5's assessment

The run used the required reviewer, so it does not fail outright: every review-gate pass ran on gpt-6.1-sol at high effort through codex exec. The agent (deepseek-v4.1-flash, high) built the three-commit stack the goal file laid out:

  1. Uniqueness enforcement. Schema v12 adds a unique index on credentials(name), both in the upgrade path and for fresh databases. A v11 database that has a duplicate name fails startup with a specific error, and the file is left unchanged. Rename now refuses names held by either provider. Login refuses a name the other provider holds, with a new account_name_taken code, checked both at login start and at install.
  2. Name-only requests. provider is removed from the six account-identifying request bodies and from the accounts set/delete/rename CLI commands. Names are resolved against live membership through Controls::policy_for.
  3. Shell. The shell's request bodies are updated to match.

Specs, docs, API_REVISIONS, lore and TODO are kept in step. The change works: in my run the agent's checkout passes its full Rust suite (781 + 6 + 8 passed, 0 failed).

The most important problem traces to the goal file. The planner wrote that a body still sending provider "gets 400". In fact the existing code returns 422 for that kind of error. Prompted by the reviewer, the agent made the code match the goal. As a result, every field or type error on the six endpoints, not just the leftover provider field, now returns 400 instead of 422, while the other control endpoints still return 422. This choice accounts for the three upstream hidden-test failures. The fourth hidden failure is an unrelated timing flake.

Smaller problems:

DefectClass
Opt-in real Codex test still sends provider in the disable request
src/codex_real_tests.rs, MoveTrigger::OperatorDisable branch
clear, minor
from reading
Detached doc comment: api_error's docstring now heads invalid_body
src/control.rs, above invalid_body/api_error
clear, minor
not behavior, ran it
All body field/type errors on six account endpoints changed from 422 to 400
src/control.rs invalid_body (used by set_priority, set_priorities, set_enabled, delete_account, rename_account, refresh_account)
judgment, minor
ran it
Shell rename does not refresh the other provider's routing explanations when dropping a stale row
shell/src/dashboard.ts commitRenamed
judgment, minor
from reading
Shell priority types still carry an unused provider field
shell/src/api.ts savePriorities, shell/src/PriorityBoard.tsx PriorityEntry
judgment, minor
not behavior, from reading
Shell adaptation commit typed refactor although it changes wire requests
commit e0c041b message
judgment, minor
not behavior, from reading
Opus 5.5's full assessment
Summary

The run used the required reviewer, so it does not fail outright: every review-gate pass ran on gpt-6.1-sol at high effort through codex exec. The agent (deepseek-v4.1-flash, high) built the three-commit stack the goal file laid out:

  1. Uniqueness enforcement. Schema v12 adds a unique index on credentials(name), both in the upgrade path and for fresh databases. A v11 database that has a duplicate name fails startup with a specific error, and the file is left unchanged. Rename now refuses names held by either provider. Login refuses a name the other provider holds, with a new account_name_taken code, checked both at login start and at install.
  2. Name-only requests. provider is removed from the six account-identifying request bodies and from the accounts set/delete/rename CLI commands. Names are resolved against live membership through Controls::policy_for.
  3. Shell. The shell's request bodies are updated to match.

Specs, docs, API_REVISIONS, lore and TODO are kept in step. The change works: in my run the agent's checkout passes its full Rust suite (781 + 6 + 8 passed, 0 failed).

The most important problem traces to the goal file. The planner wrote that a body still sending provider "gets 400". In fact the existing code returns 422 for that kind of error. Prompted by the reviewer, the agent made the code match the goal. As a result, every field or type error on the six endpoints, not just the leftover provider field, now returns 400 instead of 422, while the other control endpoints still return 422. This choice accounts for the three upstream hidden-test failures. The fourth hidden failure is an unrelated timing flake.

Smaller problems:

Process
Defects

1. Malformed-body errors on six endpoints switched from 422 to 400

2. The opt-in real-Codex test still sends provider

3. Shell rename cache does not refresh the other provider's routing data

Tests

Hidden tests. Upstream's src/proxy_tests.rs was overlaid on the agent's checkout: 778 passed, 4 failed.

| Failing test | Classification | Why | |---|---|---| | proxy::transport_tests::account_bodies_reject_legacy_fields_and_unknown_names | Design | Expects 422 for a body with provider; the agent returns 400 because the goal file explicitly said 400 (Defect 1). | | proxy::transport_tests::management_positional_arrays_cannot_mutate_accounts | Design | Same 400 vs 422 difference, here for a JSON array body. | | proxy::transport_tests::priority_batches_validate_atomically_and_preserve_exact_values | Design | Same 400 vs 422 difference, here for an extra field in a batch entry. | | auth_control::tests::unchanged_refresh_and_metadata_rejection_cannot_bypass_renewal_floor | Not related to the change | Timing-sensitive renewal test in the agent's own (not overlaid) test file; the agent did not touch it. It passed in my full run of the agent's checkout and 5 of 5 times run alone. |

The JSON form below only allows "defect" or "design", so I record the flake there as design.

What I ran. cargo test --locked --all-targets --all-features on a copy of result/ gave 781 + 6 + 8 passed, 0 failed, 12 ignored. I also re-ran the flaky auth test five times alone; it passed every time.

What the agent's own tests cover:

Left unpinned:

The code handles all three correctly as far as I can read, but no test pins them.

Other issues
Compared with upstream
Leak assessment

Clean. The single leakscan.md hit is a Python edit of docs/api.md that contains curl examples against a local address. The GitHub URLs in the transcripts are text from repository docs the agents read (openai/codex, codex-lb, the project's own URL in a doc), not fetches. There was no git fetch, no clone, and no access to another copy of the project.

GPT-6.1 Sol's assessment

The agent implemented schema v12 with globally unique configured account names, name-only account requests and CLI commands, and the corresponding shell adaptation. The core storage and API behavior works in the tests examined, including duplicate-name upgrade refusal without losing rows. The four hidden-test failures are not implementation defects: three reflect an intentional HTTP-status difference specified by the planner, and the fourth is a pre-existing test race reproduced on the starting code. One behavioral defect remains: a cross-provider rename can leave the shell displaying stale burn-routing decisions after removing a cached account. The change also leaves an obsolete CLI example in the specification and an optional interactive-client test sending a request the new API rejects. The required review gate used the correct model and effort.

DefectClass
Cross-provider rename retains stale burn decisions
shell/src/dashboard.ts:190, commitRenamed
clear, major
ran it
Specification retains the removed CLI provider argument
SPEC.md:735, Manual priorities CLI example
clear, minor
not behavior, ran it
Optional interactive-client test sends an obsolete account request
src/codex_real_tests.rs:2375, forced_move_over_websocket
clear, minor
not behavior, from reading

Process issues:

GPT-6.1 Sol's full assessment
Summary

The agent implemented schema v12 with globally unique configured account names, name-only account requests and CLI commands, and the corresponding shell adaptation. The core storage and API behavior works in the tests examined, including duplicate-name upgrade refusal without losing rows. The four hidden-test failures are not implementation defects: three reflect an intentional HTTP-status difference specified by the planner, and the fourth is a pre-existing test race reproduced on the starting code. One behavioral defect remains: a cross-provider rename can leave the shell displaying stale burn-routing decisions after removing a cached account. The change also leaves an obsolete CLI example in the specification and an optional interactive-client test sending a request the new API rejects. The required review gate used the correct model and effort.

Process
Defects
  1. Cross-provider rename leaves the removed provider’s burn decisions cached.

    Where: result/shell/src/dashboard.ts:190, commitRenamed, specifically the invalidateBurn call at line 195.

    Scenario: The shell caches Claude account a and Codex accounts b and c. Codex b is the burn target; c has a later reset. Another client disables and deletes b, freeing its name. This shell then successfully renames Claude a to b, and subsequent account reads fail.

    The function correctly removes the stale Codex b row, but invalidates burn decisions only for the source provider, Claude. Codex c retains its old “later reset” decision even though the account it was behind has disappeared. The shell therefore presents obsolete routing information instead of “Burn status pending.” This violates the affected-provider invalidation requirement in result/SPEC.md:119 and result/SPEC_impl.md:2029.

    Evidence: Confirmed by executing the actual TypeScript commitRenamed, identity and invalidateBurn functions with synthetic cached rows. The agent’s result leaves Codex c’s burn object unchanged; upstream clears it. The fix is to invalidate both the source provider and every provider represented by a discarded destination row.

    This is an execution omission in the reviewer-requested cache repair, not a behavior the goal instructed the agent to preserve.

Tests

Hidden tests: Only src/proxy_tests.rs was overlaid from upstream. The main test binary reported 778 passed, 4 failed, 12 ignored.

| Failing test | Classification | Finding | |---|---|---| | proxy::transport_tests::account_bodies_reject_legacy_fields_and_unknown_names | Design difference | The first failure is an old-format body receiving HTTP 400 instead of upstream’s expected 422. It is still rejected before mutation. | | proxy::transport_tests::management_positional_arrays_cannot_mutate_accounts | Design difference | Positional arrays receive 400 rather than 422. Both implementations reject them. | | proxy::transport_tests::priority_batches_validate_atomically_and_preserve_exact_values | Design difference | An entry with an extra field receives 400 rather than 422. This is rejection-status disagreement, not evidence of a partial batch write. | | auth_control::tests::unchanged_refresh_and_metadata_rejection_cannot_bypass_renewal_floor | Pre-existing test race; non-defect | The assertion observes credential revision 2 while expecting 3. I reproduced the identical failure on the starting code. |

The 400 choice comes from the supplied planner’s goal, which explicitly requires 400 for the removed provider field. The agent consistently maps account-body data errors to 400 while preserving 413 and 415. The original prompt and answers do not require upstream’s 422 choice.

The renewal failure is not actually a competing design choice. It is classified as design in the final JSON solely because the required schema has no flaky/unrelated category. The test function is byte-identical to the starting version. Its notification barrier can consume an earlier publication notification and allow the later assertion to run before renewal finishes.

Agent coverage: The added and adapted tests cover supported-version upgrades, duplicate-name rollback, fresh-store collision refusal, login-start and login-install conflicts, cross-provider rename refusal, request validation, CLI parsing, and provider-free shell writes. The new shell rename regression verifies that the stale destination card disappears through failed reads, but includes no remaining account from that destination provider; consequently it misses the burn-cache defect.

Independent checks, all in temporary copies:

The agent’s transcripts also show successful formatting, Clippy and 177 shell browser/forwarding tests. I did not rerun the browser suite or the ignored real-client tests. base/ and result/ remain unchanged.

Other issues
  1. The specification still documents the removed CLI provider argument.

    result/SPEC.md:735, under Manual priorities, still prescribes accounts ... set claude <label> <priority> and says to substitute codex for Codex accounts. The implementation, README and API guide correctly use the name alone. Following the specification’s example produces an argument error; I confirmed this by running it. This is a missed required specification update, not an intentional alternative in the goal.

  2. An optional interactive-client test still sends the obsolete request body.

    result/src/codex_real_tests.rs:2375, in forced_move_over_websocket, sends provider when disabling the original account. The new handler rejects that body with 400, so tui_forced_move_continues_over_websocket will fail its success assertion before testing conversation movement when run with its prerequisites. This conclusion is from reading; I did not run the real-client test. Leaving that test ignored was permitted, but leaving its request incompatible with the changed API was not.

The three-commit stack is otherwise focused: uniqueness enforcement, name-only API/CLI requests, then shell adaptation. The messages use Conventional Commit syntax, explain the relevant constraints, and keep tests and most documentation with their corresponding changes. No unrelated production scope was added.

Compared with upstream
Leak assessment

Clean. The sole leakscan.md hit is an edit to documentation containing local curl examples, not an HTTP download. The transcripts show normal dependency installation and the authorized reviewer launches, but no evidence of obtaining the upstream solution or a later project version. The planner-provided neighboring goal and review files were authorized inputs under the stated mechanism.